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Abstract—Attacks by Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs)
have been shown to be difficult to detect using traditional
signature- and anomaly-based intrusion detection approaches.
Deception techniques such as decoy objects, often called honey
items, may be deployed for intrusion detection and attack
analysis, providing an alternative to detect APT behaviours.
This work explores the use of honey items to classify intrusion
interactions, differentiating automated attacks from those which
need some human reasoning and interaction towards APT
detection. Multiple decoy items are deployed on honeypots in a
virtual honey network, some as breadcrumbs to detect indications
of a structured manual attack. Monitoring functionality was
created around Elastic Stack with a Kibana dashboard created
to display interactions with various honey items. APT type
manual intrusions are simulated by an experienced pentesting
practitioner carrying out simulated attacks. Interactions with
honey items are evaluated in order to determine their suitability
for discriminating between automated tools and direct human
intervention. The results show that it is possible to differentiate
automatic attacks from manual structured attacks; from the
nature of the interactions with the honey items. The use of honey
items found in the honeypot, such as in later parts of a structured
attack, have been shown to be successful in classification of
manual attacks, as well as towards providing an indication of
severity of the attacks
Index Terms—deception, honeypots, honeynets, honeytokens,
APT, early intrusion detection, human actions, severity, intent
I. INTRODUCTION
Ahmad et al. [1] have recently defined APTs as An
entity that engages in a malicious, organized, and highly
sophisticated long-term or reiterated network intrusion and
exploitation operation to obtain information from a target
organization, sabotage its operations, or both. APTs conduct
stealthy operations on specifically selected target organisations
and their level of sophistication includes the exploitation and
even harvesting zero-day vulnerabilities. Intellectual property
or productivity losses after APT attacks can have devastating
consequences for both public and private organisations.
Because of these characteristics, APTs remain a major
challenge for security professionals. There is evidence in lit-
erature that both signature-based and anomaly-based intrusion
detection techniques may be ineffective against APTs due to
either a high rate of false positives, false negatives or both
[2], [3]. Regular server patching will also not defend against
an attack employing zero-day vulnerabilities; and persistent
spear-phishing means that it only takes one click for the
attacker to set foothold inside the network of an organisation
and deploy their custom-coded back-door tools [4].
Therefore, there is still a need for new and effective APT
attack detection paradigms and techniques applicable in prac-
tice, over a wide range of organisations and industries. In this
context, the use of deception techniques has gained recent
popularity [5], [6] and also recently explored by the MITRE
Corporation [7], and so has been selected as the technique to
be explored and investigated in this work.
The original deception device: the honeypot, was developed
over 30 years ago with the purpose of attracting attackers to
reveal their intentions, strategies and toolset. Most recently the
use of other honey items, known more generally as ”deception
techniques” operate on the basis that any interaction with
these resources is malicious in nature and can be detected
by traditional monitoring systems.
Deception has developed over the years to include complex
constructs such as honeynets and simplified elements known
as honeytokens. The latter is a very general concept and is
normally defined as a honeypot that is not a computer, but
rather a sort of digital entity that has no legitimate purpose [8].
As the role of deception techniques in cyber security increases,
so will the need for an ethical framework. Early research
suggests that defensive deception, such as proposed in this
work, is generally ethical [9].
This paper seeks to experimentally verify that it is possible
to detect and classify intrusions according to the level of
human reasoning and interaction required to execute or set
them up, making use of honeytokens within a self contained
system. This is in contrast to prior work which does not
experimentally evaluate the use of honeytokens for intrusion
detection [8], [10]–[12]. Insights gained from this work are
also useful when reasoning whether actions are carried out by
a human actor, as honeytokens are designed to require human
reasoning, while prior work makes use of statistical heuristics
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to identify automated tools [13], [14].
The objective is achieved by setting up an experimental
honeypot system in a real private cloud environment to test its
ability to detect intrusions and classify them as stated above.
II. BACKGROUND
A big challenge in preventing APT attacks lies in the ef-
fectiveness of social engineering, targeting the human element,
which is notoriously difficult to mitigate technically. APTs are
also inherently stealthy in their operation and constantly adapt
to countermeasures developed to uncover them, as has been
evidenced by efforts to catalogue and classify their techniques,
tactics and procedures (TTPs) [15], [16].
But before an APT launches a social engineering attack,
they must collect as much information about the target as
possible, and this presents an opportunity to detect their
activity, as has been demonstrated in prior work [12], [17].
However, once the initial attack vector has been successful
by means of the exploitation of a vulnerability, the attack has
successfully compromised a host inside the company intranet.
At this stage it can be said that the attacker has gained
control of a host inside the defence perimeter, and the next
stage of infection can be initiated, such as privilege escalation
and lateral movements. These steps, even though aided by
hacking tools, are human driven as they requires analysis of
the findings and decision of where to go next. In this sense,
an APT attack may share characteristics with insider threats;
because the actions taken after the initial foothold are driven
by human actors from compromised user accounts [12].
There are two distinct traditional intrusion detection ap-
proaches: signature-based Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS),
and anomaly-based IDS: Signature-based IDS are designed to
detect specific pre-defined patterns of malicious behaviour and
are therefore ineffective against APTs due to the innovative,
polymorphic and stealthy nature of these types of attacks. This
fact is well known in the research community and therefore
the focus has shifted towards anomaly-based detection tech-
niques [12], which focus on detecting intrusions by attempting
to recognise patterns of unusual behaviour as reflected in host
logs and network traces, generally by using machine learning
or hybrid techniques combining deterministic, signature-based
and artificial intelligence approaches.
However, some authors [12], [18] claim that anomaly-based
detection systems are flawed at the root of their assumption to
detect APT actors: while the machine learning paradigm as-
sumes training based on known malicious behaviour patterns,
it cannot be expected to be effective against new or unknown
attack patterns. It has also been reported that anomaly-based
detection systems generate a large amount of log data that
needs to be examined by human analysts [10], which includes
a large number of false positives. The investigation of ways to
reduce the number of false positives continues to be the subject
of recent research by Krishna et al. [3]. Likewise, ”normal”
behaviour data-sets for training are difficult to obtain [18].
Nicho, Oluwasegun and Kamoun [19] also concur, pointing
out that APTs exploit unknown attack patterns or have care-
fully studied how to evade well-known security mechanisms.
Due to the APTs level of sophistication designed to avoid
detection by conventional means, researchers widely agree that
these type of attacks are virtually impossible to prevent [12],
that an effective defence cannot rely on prevention alone [20],
and that the base assumption should be that the malicious
actor has already breached the perimeter [21]. Industry analyst
Gartner predicted that by 2020, prevention-centred strategies
will be completely ineffective against targeted attacks [22],
and this is certainly the consensus of the research community.
A shift in emphasis from prevention to response [23]
necessarily requires an effective detection mechanism. A key
element in countering these types of actors need to be in
the early detection of their activity so that countermeasures
and escalation prevention actions can be initiated as early as
possible in order to limit damages.
FireEye [24] reported that, on average, adversaries inside
a North American network remain undetected for 56 days, a
figure which is even greater in other regions. CrowdStrike [25]
found that, on average in 2019, an adversary takes 9 hours
to move laterally and compromise other hosts within an
organisation; all of which emphasises the need for fast and
early detection of breaches.
Two key advantage of deception techniques is that their
false-positive rate can be significantly lower compared with
other intrusion detection techniques, as any interaction is by
definition not normal; and at the same time have a higher
probability of reducing the false-negative rate, as any new,
unknown pattern of attack is likely to be successful against
deployed honeypots [8] and therefore effectively detected [26].
While honeypots are essentially computer hosts with a CPU
at its core; honeytokens are not and take many forms. Files
with decoy content can be honeytokens if they are planted
throughout the network’s resources and given interesting
names, such as master-passwords, and monitored for access,
as suggested by Kim and Spafford [27]. Their work is the
earliest suggestion of the possible usefulness of a honeytoken
even before the term was coined.
False records can be honeytokens; such as fake user or user-
name entries in databases: If the record is used to attempt to
access additional information, it would signal an unauthorised
breach [8]. As Spitzner [28] notes, the concept of a honeytoken
can be extended beyond database entries: file, Web or email
servers can all have embedded honeytokens such as unique
tags detectable by traditional signature-based IDS system.
Applied to Web Servers, Fraunholz and Schotten [26]
identified six deception techniques: Fake Web server banners;
false entries in the robot.txt file; fake error code responses;
honey or decoy files, with information leading to intrusion
detection or to distract or delay any attacker, respectively;
introducing adaptive delays to IP addresses making repetitive
requests; false comments within the HMTL code: honey-
comments containing any misleading information such as fake
credentials and fake links. These researchers applied several of
these techniques to existing production Web servers, to mislead
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attackers and increase the security of Web servers. Several of
these techniques had already been proposed by Virvilis [12].
The term ”Breadcrumbs” has recently appeared in com-
mercial literature [5], [29], referring to a type of honeytoken
planted in real production systems in order to lure attackers
towards honeypots and other decoys.
Various authors claim that the use of deception techniques
and honeytokens in particular can be effective against cyber-
attacks, however, none of these authors claims to have demon-
strated this in practice: Spitzner [8] feels that honeytokens
can be effective against actors seeking information, such as
intelligence seeking or industrial espionage. Almeshekah &
Spafford [10] conclude that deception techniques have been
shown to be effective in many contexts because they take
advantage of human biases making honey-x devices seem
plausible, but do not demonstrate this experimentally. Zhao &
Mannan [11] claim that their fake authentication and session
handler Uvauth can effectively deceive an attacker assuming
fake sessions can be efficiently generated, but do not report
results of any experimental trials and in their conclusions
admit that the system has not been fully evaluated. Finally,
Virvilis [12] , who proposes a number of simple and attractive
honeytoken techniques directed at detecting APT and insider-
attacks does not claim to have tested them for effectiveness.
On the other hand, other researchers working with low or
medium interaction honeypots exposing an SSH service to
the internet have explored the topic of segregating human vs
bot (i.e. automated) interactions. It is well known that hosts
exposed to the internet will be attacked by opportunistic actors
dedicated at harvesting compute boxes in order to launch
other attacks; and so these researchers logged and analysed
breach attempts in their thousands. Using medium interaction
honeypots that enabled fake login sessions, Kemppainen and
Kovanen [13] identified bots through measurable host logged
features: command timestamp consistency and delay between
commands (almost always 4 seconds), command execution
despite errors in the previous command, and detecting the
same command executed over separate sessions. Unsurpris-
ingly, they found that only 37 interactions were executed by
humans (2.3% of the total).
Udnahi et al. [14] used a low interaction honeypot (only
to capture login attempts), simulating a server farm of 65,000
hosts and analysed over 5 million connection requests. They
characterised human actions based heuristics determined from
an observation of the data: the number of requests per minute
(6 10 requests/min), the number of targets attempted (6 2
per day), rate of characters in each request (6 3 per sec)
and the speed at which the password guess is typed (6 3
characters/sec). However, this methodology did not consider
the initiation of a brute-force attack with particular username
and password dictionaries which may be derived from earlier
Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) or reconnaissance activi-
ties on the target and would be classed as actions by a bot.
III. METHODOLOGY
Given the lack of experimental data in the identification
of human interactions in the context of an insider threat or an
APT actor with a foothold inside the organisation, the research
questions to be investigated are:
RQ1: Can the influence of human reasoning and interac-
tions be deduced with the use of honeytokens in honeypots
located within the security perimeter?
RQ2: Can such an arrangement of honeytokens be used to
determine the level of intent or severity of the attack?
To answer these questions, the experimental method focused
on the deployment and evaluation of various honeytoken tech-
niques in a high interaction Linux-based honeypot deployed in
a private cloud environment. The honeypot will be connected
and communicated to via a purposely deployed virtual network
segment which also has no legitimate purpose, and is an
integral part of the deception (ie a honey sub-net).
The principle of all honeytokens for intrusion detection is
that any interaction or actions resulting from the observation of
honeytokens represent an intrusion attempt; therefore, the ex-
periment also required the setup of a network traffic, honeypot
and honeytoken monitoring infrastructure. The environment
and experimental design followed the steps below:
1) Selection of a set of honeytoken techniques, suitable to
address the research questions.
2) Selection of a honeypot where the selected honeytoken
techniques can be deployed, so that human interactions,
intent and severity of the intrusion attempt can be deter-
mined.
3) Deployment of the experimental honeypot and honeyto-
ken arrangement in a company virtual private infrastruc-
ture within a virtual sub-net.
4) Design and deployment of an intrusion detection harness
to monitor honeypot logs and network traffic indicative of
interaction with the deployed honeypots and honeytokens.
5) Setup of a VPN with direct access to the virtual sub-net
where the honeypot is located.
6) The design of the experiment to simulate and insider or
APT attack. This was done by means of a penetration
testing (pentest) engagement via the VPN.
The experimental design includes inviting pentesters and
ask they behave as APT attackers would in the second stage
of the attack; after the initial foothold within the company
firewall. The hypothesis is that they would find and try to use
the honeytokens as means of breaching the security of the hon-
eynet systems thereby triggering the detection of intrusions,
and human interaction in particular. The authors recognise that
the experimental design may differ in many aspects from the
behaviour of a real APT actor, e.g. the pentester is directed at a
particular sub-net and given a specific pentest brief, while real
attackers can decide where what and where to probe; however,
it is believed that the human behaviour of an attacker upon
observing the honey items may be similar to that of a pentester,
which is at the core of this research.
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Several honeytoken techniques were selected from the liter-
ature to help evaluate the interactions and for comparison to
previous work:
1) Use of “disallowed” entries with the robot.txt file [12],
[26]
2) An invisible link (e.g. white font over white background)
in a webpage [12], and
3) Fake credentials added as comments within the HTML
source. In the case of the fake credentials [12], [26] . This
honeytoken had an additional original added feature: the
username planted was an incomplete email; i.e lacking
the full domain name.
The selection of these honeytoken techniques is justified
based on their potential to detect human interactions and be
self-contained within the honeypot. Indeed, honeytoken 1)
and 3) may also be considered breadcrumbs, because their
discovery may invite a human actor to investigate further into
the deception: explore the disallowed folder or try the fake
credentials as a login. The selection of technique 3) also aligns
with MITRE’s technique T1081 ”Credentials in Files” [15].
The monitoring function outputs and honeytoken interac-
tions are categorised into three types of intrusion indicator,
depending on the severity of the intrusion detected:
• Low priority, if there is any level of network detected
interaction with the honeypot or the use of automatic re-
connaissance tools with minimal human reasoning. These
are indications of attacker reconnaissance activity or the
start of an attack on the honeypot.
• Medium priority, if the results of the reconnaissance
were used to take the intrusion further and attempt a
breach, with some possible human actions and if they
indicate sustained attack activity using automated tools.
• High priority, if honeytokens were discovered by a
human actor and further reasoning was applied to expand
the efforts leading to a breach, for example if the infor-
mation found in one honeytoken (a breadcrumb) was used
in a subsequent step, indicating a high level of intent.
Sub-classifications of these indicators are also possible to
indicate degrees of severity of each type of attack detected.
If intrusions are detected, which would have to have had
human associated level of prior reasoning, which were not
possible or unlikely to be executed by a bot, would point
towards fulfilling RQ1. If different intrusion level indicators
(low, medium and high) were detected in sequence from low
to high, that would indicate some success in terms of RQ2,
and a high level of intent in breaching the system.
Since all these honeytokens are part of a webserver, a fake
client user login application was implemented using PHP code
on the honeypot, which never leads to a session and simulates
variable response times to the user.
Figure 1 represents the experimental set-up and monitoring
infrastructure. The Elastic Stack, by Elastic, composed of Elas-
ticsearch, Logsatsh and Kibana was used for the monitoring
of the honeypot logs and network traffic. Filebeat, an open
source log file shipper was used to monitor various system
Fig. 1. Experiment Set Up and Network Diagram
logs and TShark was used to monitor network traffic in and
out of the honeypot. TShark can directly output a JSON file
format directly compatible with Logstash [30].
Filebeat was installed in the honeypot webserver to monitor
webserver (Nginx) and PHP logs, which were then ingested
by Logstash on the monitoring server. The Nginx logs record
access to different served pages as standard. Within the web-
page PHP code, any string message can be programmaticaly
directed to the PHP log. This feature was used to create log
messages when the index.php page was accessed and also the
user email and password entered in the login page. Filebeat
was also used to monitor the packet capture JSON log file
created by TShark.
The following filter (see below) was added to the TShark
command line to output ICMP and TCP SYN packets to or
from the honeypot, as a means to detect incoming network
activity (attack) or outgoing traffic (honeypot compromise):
tshark -i eth0 -f "icmp || (tcp[tcpflags] &
(tcp-syn) != 0 and tcp[tcpflags] & (tcp-ack)
= 0)" -T ek > /home/tshark/packets.json
Logstash was configured to create indices from these data
sources and push the result into the Elasticsearch database.
Kibana was used to set up specific monitors to detect events
of interest in a single dashboard.
A custom Kibana dashboard (Figure 2) was configured to
display (from left to right, top to bottom): a) ICMP packets, b)
Source IP and timestamp of Index.php access, c) No. of clicks
on hidden URL, d) Timestamp, Source and Destination IP of
any TCP SYN packets, e) Timestamp and credentials used in
any login attempt and f) No. of accesses to disallowed folder.
Because this setup detects traffic on the honey sub-net and
interactions with the honeypot, any event detected will have a
malicious or unauthorised implication; but with varying levels
of severity. Section V (specifically Table I) analyses the types
of intrusions that can be detected in the system as designed,
their suitability to be attacked by an automated process and
their implied intent and severity.
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Fig. 2. Kibana Dashboard
IV. PENETRATION TEST PROCESS SUMMARY
An experiment was was carried out in January 2020, with a
duration of approximately 1.5 hours. The test was conducted
by an experienced industry professional pentester.
The sequence of events of the pentest was as follows, as
described by the tester:
1) Initial brief reconnaissance of available hosts using Nmap
and including ping sweeps. Pings to the webserver (hon-
eypot) host were captured by the monitoring harness.
2) Version scan and OS detection using Nmap.
3) Analysis of HTTP requests and responses. Modifying
with special characters looking for SQLi and other code
injections, using Burp suite.
4) Vulnerability scan of HTTP servers, using Nikto.
5) Directory fuzzing of HTTP servers, using dirb.
6) Attempt to brute force login of webserver, using Hydra.
The pentest attack followed several stages as evidenced
in the Kibana dashboard and the sequence of events in the
integrated logs. The elapsed time after the test start time is
indicated between brackets.
Stage 1 – Reconnaissance
[+ 8 mins] During this stage, after a single ping; a flood of
TCP SYN packets was detected; as shown in Figure 2.
Stage 2 – Burpsuite sweep of Web application
[+ 13 mins] The count of SYN packets reaches 173 while
Burpsuite scans through the Web application pages; the main
Index.php which presents the fake login is accessed a few
times and non-authorised /admin folder is attempted 10 times.
Recall the /admin folder is included in robot.txt file as dis-
allowed; however, at this stage, it is deduced that it was
attempted to be accessed by Burpsuite irrespective of its
inclusion in robot.txt.
Stage 3 – Exploring the fake login page (Index.php)
[+ 14 mins] The count of SYN packets reaches 216 while
Burpsuite continues to scan through the Web application
pages; the main Index.php which presents the fake login is ac-
cessed 35 times and a blank login email/password combination
is detected. This is clearly the continuation of the automated
scan stage; given the number of SYN packets, the number
of detected separate accesses to Index.php and the number of
attempts to reach /admin (47 times).
Stage 4 – Login credentials, initial test
[+ 14 mins] While the automatic scanning continues; at this
stage is the first sign of human intervention with the attempted
login with credentials that could be guessed from the context
of the test.
Stage 5 – Further automated scans
[+ 17 mins] While the login attempts temporarily stop at 3; the
number of SYN packets rises again, the number of accesses
to Index.php rises to more than 20 every second and attempts
to access /admin shoots to more than 1300. This indicates a
return to automatic scanning tools, possibly dirb1. This stage
continues until with 783 SYN packets, 11 blank login attempts
and 12,004 attempts to access the /admin folder, as shown
below. As determined during the analysis of these results; this
sharp increase was the result of the use of the tool dirb, fuzzing
sub-folders inside /admin.
Stage 6 – Use of Fake Credential Honeytoken
[+ 36 mins] At this stage the attacker has examined the source
1A Web content scanner. See https://tools.kali.org/web-applications/dirb for
more information
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code of the Index.php page and identified the fake credentials
added as a comment:
<!-- test login user: eigentest1@eigen psw:
e1Ars3nal -->
And tried to use these credentials to gain access in three
opportunities: The first time he makes a mistake (password
eIArs3nal instead of e1Ars3nal), then he corrects this mistake;
and finally completing the incorrect email reference by adding
.co to the user email, as per the companys domain (eigen.co).
This stage confirms human intervention and reasoning impos-
sible to be duplicated by a robot, at least with the current state
of technology. It also demonstrates clear intent to breach the
security; as the attacker followed a series of clues to try to
breach the security of the Web page.
Stage 7 – Access to hidden link Honeytoken
[+43 mins] At this stage the hidden link was discovered and
accessed. The pentester reported that this link was discovered
with dirb; but dirb uses a fuzzing technique to try to guess
hidden folders. A wide search across all of dirb wordlist files
(command line: “cat * | grep testlogin”) revealed
that testlogin is not one of the directories that dirb could guess,
unless a very customised wordlist is used.
On the other hand, when Burpsuite was directed at the
root of the Web application in order to verify this result;
it immediately detected the link /testlogin/index.php. Since
Burpsuite was already used in Stage 2 of the pentest the
implication is that the repeated run to discover and investigate
this hidden link demonstrates a higher level of commitment
and intention to attack.
Stage 8 – Login Brute Force
[+ 66 mins] In this stage a login brute force attack was
attempted, pre-configured with variations on the original login
honeytoken; and common simple passwords; e.g. 123456; and
usernames such as admin@eigen.co, administrator@eigen.co
and ROOT@eigen.co. An earlier login attempt with email
@gmail indicates a type of SQL injection.
[+ 94 mins] the credentials eigentest1@eigen with password
Liverpool (another football team) was attempted; again, a
variation on the planted honeytoken. By +97 mins a total
of 1412 email/password combinations had been tested; many
focusing on the username of eigentest1@eigen planted in the
honeytoken; with a large number of different passwords; which
indicates a premeditated configuration of the brute force attack
using the fake credential username discovered prior.
[+ 98 mins] the Test concluded.
V. ANALYSIS
The results of the experiment reveal some interesting find-
ings from the outputs of the monitoring functions and the
interactions with the honeytokens. Some of the monitoring
functions served to indicate an attack is being launched
without revealing the threat level or severity of the intrusion,
while others revealed clear intent and human interaction.
In what follows all these cases will be examined. Figure 3,
shows a state diagram of the attack pattern indicating the
indicator priority of each type of event detected.
Fig. 3. Attack State Diagram
Low Priority Indicators: Any detected network or Web
application interaction with the honeypot is indicative of
reconnaissance activity by a potential attacker, but in some
cases, it may be an opportunistic or an interaction by mistake
by an insider with no malicious intent.
The detection of ICMP and TCP SYN packets directed at
the honeypot both served to indicate this level of intrusion;
they were one of the earliest signs of attack activity. There
is nothing malicious about TCP SYN packets in company
networks; but in this case, they indicate possible recon or
TCP communication initiation to/from the honeypot; which
is deemed unauthorised activity. Outgoing TCP SYN packets,
would indicate a honeypot breach; a higher level of intrusion.
Signs of automatic Web app scanning and the discovery of
the fake login Index.php page is also an early indication as
can be seen from the profile of events.
Medium Priority Indicators: Initiation of a Web content scan
implies that the host was identified as serving a Web page.
Access to the /admin folder which was included in the
robot.txt file is a medium priority indicator, because this
folder was detected directly by the initial Web scan process
(Burpsuite) irrespective of its inclusion as a disallowed access
within the robot.txt file.
Also, the sheer number of hits (a total of 56,114) indicated
the use of an automated Web scanning tool, as any normal
user would not likely be accessing this folder so many times;
however, the attack can still be opportunistic because it used a
standard tool and required little human configuration or effort.
Tests on the Web application carried out by the author using
dirb revealed that the /admin folder was one of the first folders
found by the tool, which then focused on the discovery of sub-
folders within the /admin folder: This helps to explain why so
many hits were detected.
A better implementation of this honeytoken might be the
inclusion of less commonly named disallowed folders in
robot.txt, one that is not part of dirbs dictionaries or commonly
used by Web developers, so that it would not have been
scanned directly by common Web scanning tools using fuzzing
techniques; but rather indicate an analysis of the contents of
the robot.txt file.
Another medium priority indicator can be the access to
the hidden link /testlogin/index.php; since it was not detected
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Event detected Implication Severity Level(Design)
Auto/
Human Actual Result and Severity
ICMP pings or incoming SYN
traffic on Honeypot 1
Initial stages of reconnaissance, opportunistic
attacker or involuntary action by insider. Very Low Auto
Verified Correct. Very Low.
(packet capture)
Access to Index.php of the
Webserver
Initial stages of webserver reconnaissance. Low Auto Verified Correct. Low. (Nginx log)
Click on hidden url Web application crawling Medium-Low Auto orHuman
Verified Correct. The link was
most probably discovered by
Burpsuite; towards the end of the
pentest. (hidden
/testlogin/index.php)
Login to Honeypots 1 attempt via
SSH
Attempt to breach security via online brute
force Medium-Low
Auto or
Human Not observed.
Login attempt in Web portal with
any username/password
Attempt to breach security via online brute
force
Medium-High Auto orHuman
Verified Correct. Medium-High.
(Log of usr/psw from PHP code)
Access attempt to disallowed
entry in robot.txt
Deliberate malicious attempt to expand
reconnaissance scope Medium-High Auto
Disallowed entry was not a factor
in browsing the folder Low.
(Access to /admin)
Login attempt in Web portal with
the honeytoken credentials hidden
as HTML comments
Attempt to breach security via online brute
force after examining the comments in the
HTML. Indicative of human action.
High Human Verified Correct. High. (Log ofusr/psw from PHP code)
Login attempts in Web portal with
variations of the theme of the
honeytoken credentials hidden as
HTML comments
Attempt to breach security via online brute
force after examining the comments in the
HTML and reasoning logical variations.
Indicative of human reasoning and action.
High-High Human Verified Correct. High-High. (Logof usr/psw from PHP code)
TCP SYN initiated from any
honeypot (breach of honeypot
shell)
Successful security breach. If honeypots have
been patched to latest version, implies possible
exploitation of zero-day vulnerability
High-High
(APT breach) Human Not Observed.
TABLE I
HONEYTOKEN INTERACTIONS AND SEVERITY OF THE DETECTED EVENTS
until stage 7 of the pentest; via the use of an automatic tool.
The main advantage of this honeytoken is the fact that we
can be almost certain that is was detected by automatic tool,
because the link is invisible to the human eye.
High Priority Indicators: The honeytoken that resulted in the
most effective high priority indicator was the fake credentials
within the HTML page comments. The use of these credentials
indicated deliberate analysis of the contents of the HMTL
source file and the introduction of variations in the credentials
that were tested suggests the presence of a committed human
actor, intent on breaching the security of the Web server.
The three login attempts with variations on the fake creden-
tials were detected, including correcting a typo and adding the
correct domain name to the fake user email; which could only
be human attempts based on prior acquired knowledge.
This manual, low intensity, breach attempt was followed by
an automated brute force attack towards the end of the pentest.
This brute force attack is also a high priority indicator in that
it takes human effort to configure and launch the attacking
tool (in this case Hydra) pre-configured with the username
previously obtained from the HTML comment honeytoken.
The brute force attack is easily detectable by the large
number of login attempts (1406) vs the prior manual attempts
or by other Web scanning tools such as Burpsuite (45).
The results of the experiment indicate that it is indeed
possible to differentiate between automated attacks and those
with human involvement, by means of the monitoring and
honeytoken techniques deployed.
Table I summarises the results of the observations and their
implication in terms of automated vs human interactions, level
of intent and severity. The experimental results verify that it
was possible to segregate initial reconnaissance activities and
automatic Web application scanning operations from human
reasoned and initiated attacks within the security perimeter
(RQ1). It was also possible to infer the level of intent of the
attacker using the technique of planting credentials that hinted
at possible variations, such as completing a correct domain
name (in this case adding a “.co” at the end), which in itself
implies previous knowledge of the owner of the site being
attacked (RQ2). This was also verified by the evidence of an
automated brute force attack which was configured to use the
fake username credentials and a dictionary of passwords. The
fact that the attacker was led to try a further attack based
on the honeytoken shows that the concept of breadcrumbs
could be effective in detecting a structured attack. Indeed, this
simple honeytoken technique (planted fake credentials) can be
used, not only within HTML comments, but also within files,
configured within domains, and as email accounts, as shown
in previous work in the area of honey items.
These results demonstrate that it is possible to assign a
priority or severity level to intrusion detection events by use of
simple honeytokens and breadcrumbs. The concepts explored
here could be improved and extended by: a) Using non-
common folder names that cannot be fuzzed; b) Extending
the use of breadcrumb honeytokens in production servers,
giving clues that point to the honeypots or invite a login
7
to servers; c) Allowing some of the fake credentials planted
to be valid logins within honeypots, which can lead to the
discovery of other honeytokens; thereby leading the attacker
into a false trail of discovery, all the while being observed;
and d) designing honeytokens that can be discovered by the
documented MITRE ATT&CK TTPs [15].
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The results of the experiment reveal an increment in the
level of human reasoning and actions: While at the start,
the human actor is launching automatic reconnaissance tools
(Low priority), very soon this leads to the more detailed
investigation of findings and even attempting a few manual
attempts to login with any generic context-related credentials
(Medium priority). The detection of these Low and Medium
priority indicators starts to give a positive answer to RQ1.
Finally, the discovery of the fake credential breadcrumb leads
to manually testing them directly, creating plausible variations
and setting up a brute force attack based on them, all of which
demonstrate a high degree of human reasoning and a high
level of intent (High priority), demonstrating both RQ1 and
RQ2. Prior research focused on detecting automated attacks
on login attempts due to their regularity or predictability and
considering all other events as human driven, but the present
work focuses directly on capturing those events which are very
likely executed by a human showing that honeytokens are a
very simple but effective technique in achieving this.
If this type of deception is embedded within an organisa-
tion’s intranet, it has the potential to detect the start of an APT
or insider threat attack with very low false positives (as the
attack intent and reality would be verified by the detection
of ever higher priority indicators that demonstrate human
actions) and low false negatives, as the honeytokens would
be discoverable by any new unknown type of attack. Future
work can focus on extending the use of the most effective
honeytoken techniques across production server and client
hosts and allowing some of the fake credentials to initiate
controlled sessions within honeypots to continue to observe the
behaviour of the attacker. Future ambitious experiments that
could reach more general conclusions could focus on setting
up a completely fake company network on a public cloud,
with fake user avatars that allow themselves to be hacked via
phishing emails, in order to study the path of real APT actors
in the wild from initial foothold onward.
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